vision only extends to a few inches; yet so strong is the afsociation between the original perceptions of fight, and the conceptions which they habitually produce, that it is not possible for us, by any effort of our will, to prevent these conceptions from taking place. From these observations it appears, that when the conceptions of the mind are rendered steady and permanent, by being strongly associated with any sensible impreffion, they cominand our belief no less than our actual perceptions; and, therefore, if it were possible for us, with our eyes shut, to keep up, for a length of time, the conception of any sensible object, we should, as long as this effort continued, believe that the object was present to our fenfes. It appears to me to be no flight confirmation of these remarks, that although, in the dark, the illufions of imagination are much more liable to be miftaken for realities, than when their momentary effects on the belief are continually checked and corrected by the objects which the light of day presents to our perceptions; yet, even total darkness is not fo alarming to a person impressed with the vulgar stories of apparitions, as a faint and doubtful twilight, which affords to the conceptions an opportunity of fixing and prolonging their existence, by attaching themselves to fomething which is obfcurely exhibited to the eye.-In like manner, when we look through a fog, we are frequently apt to mistake a crow for a man; and the conception we have, upon fuch an occafion, of the human figure, is much more distinct and much more steady, than it would be poffible for us to form, if we had no sensible object before us; infomuch that when on a more attentive observation, the crow shrinks to its own dimensions, we find it impossible, by any effort, to conjure up the phantom which a moment before we seemed to perceive. If these obfervations are admitted, the effects which 1 exhibitions of fictitious distress produce on the mind, will appear less wonderful, than they are supposed to be. During the representation of a tragedy, I acknowledge, that we have a general conviction that the whole is a fiction; but, I believe, it will be found, that the violent emotions which are sometimes produced by the distresses of the stage, take their rife, in most cafes, from a momentary belief, that the distresses are real. I say, in most cafes; because I acknowledge, that independently of any such belief, there is something contagious in a faithful expression of any of the paffions. The emotions produced by tragedy are, upon this supposition, somewhat analogous to the dread we feel when we look down from the battlement of a tower.* In both cafes, we have a general conviction, that there is no ground for the feelings we experi. ence; but the momentary influences of imagination are so powerful as to produce these feelings, before reflection has time to come to our relief. * With respect to the dread which we feel in looking down from the battlement of a tower, it is curious to remark the effects of habit in gradually destroying it. The manner in which habit operates in this case, seems to be by giving us a command over our thoughts, so as to enable us to withdraw our attention from the precipice before us, and direct it to any other object at pleasure. It is thus that the mason and the sailor not only can take precautions for their own safety, but remain completely masters of themselves in situations where other men, engrossed with their imaginary danger, would experience a total suspension of their faculties. Any strong passion which occupies the mind produces, for the moment, the same effect with habit. A person alarmed with the apprehension of fire, has been known to escape from the top of a house, by a path which, at another time, he would have considered as impracticable; and soldiers, in mounting a breach, are said to have sometimes found their way to the enemy, by a route which appeared inaccessible after their violent passions had subsided. CHAPTER FOURTH. Of Abstraction. ? SECTION I. General obfervations on this Faculty of the Mind. THE origin of appellative, or, in other words, the origin of those classes of objects which, in the schools, are called genera, and species, has been confidered by fome philofophers as one of the most difficult problems in metaphyfics. The account of it which is given by Mr. Smith, in his Differtation on the Origin of Languages, appears to me to be equally simple and fatisfactory. "The affignation" (says he) " of particular names, " to denote particular objects; that is, the institution " of nouns substantive; would probably be one of "the first steps towards the formation of Language. "The particular cave, whose covering sheltered the "favage from the weather; the particular tree, "whose fruit relieved his hunger; the particular " fountain, whose water allayed his thirst; would " first be denominated by the words, cave, tree, foun"tain; or by whatever other appellations he might " think proper, in that primitive jargon, to mark "them. Afterwards, when the more enlarged ex"perience of this savage had led him to observe, " and his neceffary occafions obliged him to make " mention of, other caves, and other trees, and other "fountains; he would naturally bestow upon each " of those new objects, the fame name by which he " had been accustomed to express the similar object S " he was first acquainted with. And thus, those " woods, which were originally the proper names of " individuals, would each of them insensibly become "the common name of a multitude."* "It is this application" (he continues) " of the " name of an individual to a great number of objects, "whose resemblance naturally recals the idea of that " individual, and of the name which expresses it, " that feems originally to have given occasion to the " formation of those claffes, and affortments, which, " in the schools, are called genera and species; and of " which the ingenious and eloquent Rousseau finds " himself so much at a lofs to account for the origin. "What constitutes a species, is merely a number of " objects, bearing a certain degree of resemblance to " one another; and, on that account, denominated " by a single appellation, which may be applied to " express any one of them."t This view of the natural progress of the mind, in forming classifications of external objects, receives some illustration from a fact mentioned by Captain Cook in his account of a small island called Wateeoo, which he visited in failing from New Zealand to the Friendly islands. "The inhabitants," says he, were " afraid to come near our cows and horfes, nor did "they form the least conception of their nature. "But the sheep and goats did not furpass the limits * The same account of the progress of the mind in the formation of genera, is given by the Abbé de Condillac. " Un enfant appelle du nom d'Arbre le premier arbre que nous lui montrons. Un second arbre qu'il voit en"suite lui rapelle la même idée; il lui donne le nême "nom; de même à un troisième, à un quatrième, et voilà " le mot d'Arbre donné d'abord à un individu, qui devient " pour lui un nom de classe ou de genre, une ideé abstraite " qui comprend tous les arbres en général." + Dissertation on the Origin of Languages, annexed to Mr. Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments. " of their ideas; for they gave us to understand that " they knew them to be birds. It will appear," he adds, "rather incredible, that human ignorance could "ever make so strange a mistake, there not being "the most distant similitude between a sheep or "goat, and any winged animal. But these people "seemed to know nothing of the existence of any " other land animals, befides hogs, dogs, and birds. " Our sheep and goats, they could fee, were very " different creatures from the two first, and therefore " they inferred that they must belong to the latter " class, in which they knew that there is a confider"able variety of species."-I would add to Cook's very judicious remarks, that the mistake of these islanders probably did not arife from their confider. ing a fheep or a goat as bearing a more striking resemblance to a bird, than to the two classes of quadrupeds with which they were acquainted; but to the want of a generic word, such as quadruped, comprehending these two species; which men in their situation would no more be led to form, than a perfon who had only seen one individual of each species, would think of an appellative to express both, instead of applying a proper name to each. In consequence of the variety of birds, it appears, that they had a generic name comprehending all of them, to which it was not unnatural for them to refer any new animal they met with. The classification of different objects supposes a power of attending to some of their qualities or attributes, without attending to the rest; for no two objects are to be found without fome specific differ. ence; and no afsortment of arrangement can be formed among things not perfectly alike, but by losing fight of their diftinguishing peculiarities, and limiting the attention to those attributes which belong to them in common. Indeed, without this power of attending separately to things which our fenfes |
