they had nothing to determine, except the fact of printing and publishing, and whether or no the blanks or innuendoes were properly filled up in the information; but that, whether the defendant had committed a crime or not, was no matter

fatigable perseverance was at length carried through the legislature, has nullified Lord Mansfield's doctrine, and set the important question completely at rest.

Mr. Woodfall, as a party concerned, modestly forbore to offer any statement of this celebrated trial in the Public Advertiser, in consequence of which the writer is obliged to avail himself of the following extract, though very imperfectly given, from a contemporary journal.

An account of the trial at Guildhall of the original publisher of Junius's Letter to the King.

Yesterday morning, [June 13, 1770,] about nine o'clock, came on before Lord Mansfield, in the Court of King's-bench at Guildhall, the trial of Mr. Woodfall, the original printer of JUNIUS's letter in the Public Advertiser of December 19. Only seven of the special jury attended, viz. William Bond, foreman; Peter Cazalet, Alexander Peter Allen, Frederick Commerell, Hermen Meyer, John Thomas, and Barrington Buggin, Upon which the following five talesmen were taken out of the box, viz, William Hannard, Paul Verges, William Sibley, William Willet, and William Davis.

The trial was opened by Mr. Wallis.

Nathaniel Crowder swore he bought the paper of Mr. Woodfall's publishing servant, whom he named.

Mr. Harris proved that the duty for the advertisements and stamps were paid by Mr. Woodfall. And

A Clerk of Sir John Fielding's proved, by a receipt from Mr. Woodfall, his concern in and for the paper.

The publication and direction of the paper by Mr. Woodfall being thus proved,

Lord Mansfield, in his charge, told the jury, That there were only two points for their consideration: the first the printing and publishing the paper in question; the second, the sense and meaning of it: That as to the charges of its being malicious, seditious, &c. they were inferences in law about which no evidence need be given, any more than that part of an indictment need be proved by evidence, which charges a man with being moved by the instigation of the Devil: That therefore the printing and sense of the paper were alone what the jury had to consider of; and that if the paper should really contain no breach of the law, that was a matter which might afterwards be moved in arrest of judgment: That he had no evidence to sum up to them, as the defendant's counsel admitted the printing and publication to be well proved: That as to the sense, they had not called in doubt the manner in which the dashes in the paper were filled up in the record, by giving any other sense to the passages; if they had,

1

of consideration to twelve men, who yet, upon their oaths, were to pronounce their peer guilty, or not guilty. When we hear such nonsense delivered from the bench, and find it supported by a laboured train of sophistry, which a plain

had, the jury would have been to consider which application was the true one, that charged in the information, or suggested by the defendant. That the jury might now compare the paper with the information: That if they did not find the application wrong, they must find the defendant guilty; and if they did find it wrong, they must acquit him: That this was not the time for alleviation or aggravation, that being for future consideration: That every subject was under the controul of the law, and had a right to expect from it protection for his person, his property, and his good name: That if any man offended the laws, he was amenable to them, and was not to be censured or punished, but in a legal course: That any person libelled had a right either to bring a civil or a criminal prosecution: That in the latter, which is by information or indictment, it is immaterial whether the publication be false or true: That it is no defence to say it is true, because it is a breach of the peace, and therefore criminal; but in a civil prosecution, it is a defence to say the charges in the publication are true; because the plaintiff there sues only for a pecuniary satisfaction to himself; and that this is the distinction as to that nature of defence.-His Lordship said, he was afraid it was too true that few characters in the kingdom escaped libels: That many were very injuriously treated-and if so, that the best way to prevent it was by an application to the law, which is open to every man: That the liberty of the press consisted in every man having the power to publish his sentiments without first applying for a licence to any one; but if any man published what was against law, he did it at his peril, and was answerable for it in the same manner as he who suffers his hand to commit an assault, or his tongue to utter blasphemy."

Between eleven and twelve the jury withdrew; at four the court adjourned; and a little after nine the jury waited on Lord Mansfield at his house in Bloomsbury-square, with their verdict, which was Guilty of PRINTING and PUBLISHING ONLY.

This charge having been laid upon the table of the House of Lords, December 10, 1770, by the Lord Chief Justice, the following questions were put to him, in his place, by Lord Camden, on the day ensuing.

1. Does the opinion mean to declare, that upon the general issue of Not Guilty, in the case of a seditious libel, the jury have no right, by law, to examine the innocence or criminality of the paper, if they think fit, and 10 form their verdict upon such examination?

2. Does the opinion mean to declare, that in the case abovementioned, when the jury have delivered in their verdict, Guilty, that this verdict has found the fact only and not the law?

2. Is it to be understood by this opinion, that if the jury come to the bar, and say that they find the printing and publishing, but that the paper

is

understanding is unable to follow, and which an unlearned jury, however it may shock their reason, cannot be supposed

is no libel, that in that case the jury have found the defendant guilty generally, and the verdict must be so entered up?

4. Whether the opinion means to say, that if the judge, after giving his opinion of the innocence or criminality of the paper, should leave the consideration of that matter, together with the printing and publishing, to the jury, such a direction would be contrary to law?

5. I beg leave to ask, whether dead and living judges, then absent, did declare their opinions in open court, and whether the noble Lord has any note of such opinions?

6. Whether they declared such opinions, after solid arguments, or upon any point judicially before them?

To these queries Lord Mansfield made no reply, briefly observing that he would not answer interrogatories.

The subject was introduced into the lower house, December 6, 1770, on a motion made by Mr. Serjeant Glynn. "That a committe should be appointed to enquire into the administration of criminal justice, and the proceedings of the judges in Westminster-hall, particularly in cases relating to the Liberty of the Press, and the constitutional power and duty of juries."

In the course of the discussion, the speakers on both sides alluded not only to the charge in Mr. Woodfall's case, but also to Mr. Baron Smythe's conduct in trying a Scotch serjeant at Guildford, which will be found more particularly detailed in the Editor's note to JUNIUS's Letter LXVIII. Amongst the chief speakers on this occasion were, as we have already observed, on the side of the ministry, Mr. Fox, and on that of the people, Mr. Burke. The following summary of their argument, which in truth contains the general argument of the rest, is extracted from a pamphlet entitled Vox Senatûs, printed previous to the contest which soon afterwards ensued, between the House of Commons and the Printers, respecting the publication of parliamentary debates, and which, in a great measure, led the way to that controversy. The speeches in this pamphlet were altogether reported by the late Mr. Wm. Woodfall, whose strength of memory, nice accuracy and rigid impartiality, were equally subjects of admiration, and held in the highest veneration, by the members of both houses of parliament, to whatever party they might belong, during the many years that he continued to exercise his talents in that most laborious, and we trust we may add, most important branch of public duty.

Mr. Fox spoke as follows:

"We are told by the abettors of this motion, that jealousies, murmurs, and discontents encrease and multiply throughout the nation; that the people are under terrible apprehensions that the law is perverted, the juries are deprived of their constitutional powers, that the courts of justice are not sound and untainted; in a word, that the judges have, like a dozen of monstrous Patagonian giants, either swallowed, or are going to swallow

up

qualified to refute, can it be wondered that they should return a verdict, perplexed, absurd, or imperfect?-Lord Mans

up both law and gospel. And how do they prove the truth of these allegations? the manner is pleasant enough. They refer us to their own libellous remonstrances, and to those infamous lampoons and satires, which, they have taken care to write and circulate. They modestly substitute themselves in the place of the nation, and call their own complaints the grievances of England. Their meaning is plain enough, and we understand perfectly how all their grievances might be redressed. For my part I am not disposed to take the voice of a miserable faction for the voice of my country. Were the people really dissatisfied, I should be glad to know how I am to ascertain the reality of that dissatisfaction? I must freely confess, that I know no other way but that of consulting this House. Here the people are represented, and here their voice expressed. There is no other criterion but the majority of this assembly, by which we can judge of their sentiments. This man, in order to answer one purpose, and that man, in order to answer another, will tell you that a general cry has gone abroad against certain men and measures, but will you be so credulous as to take him upon his word, when you can easily penetrate his interested views and find him the original and prime mover of all the clamour? I can easily trace the authors of the outcry raised against the judges; and I would point them out, had not they, as well as their selfish ends, been already exposed in all their deformity. Why then, should we hesitate to put a negative upon a question, which sprung from such a low source? from dirt it came, and to dirt let it return. As to myself, I certainly will, as I can never acknowledge for the voice of the nation, what is not echoed by the majority of the house; and I do not find that the majority of us entertain any suspicions, much less terrible apprehensions, of the judges; though, if there were any just foundation for complaint, we must certainly have been better informed of it than the people.

Indeed if the adoption of this enquiry would answer any good purpose, I should not be such a violent opposer, convinced as I am that the judges are blameless. But I am fully persuaded, that would not be the case. For as I have shown, it would be an attempt to remove discontents which do not exist but among those who have generated, fostered, and reared them up to their present magnitude, and would not, therefore, be satisfied, though Justice, though Astrea herself, should descend naked from heaven to exculpate our judges. And what is more, it would, on their own principles, prove fruitless and nugatory, even if we suppose the people to be really discontented. For what have they been doing for these two last years, but ringing constantly in our ears the contempt in which we are held by the people? have they not made these walls echo with the terms of reproach, which they alledged were cast upon us by men of every degree, by high and low, rich and poor, learned and unlearned? were we not, and are we not still, according to their account, held in universal detestation and abhorrence? does not the whole empire, from one end to the other, reckon

us

field has not yet explained to the world, why he accepted of a verdict, which the court afterwards set aside as illegal,

us equally weak and wicked? in a word, are we not become an abomination in the land? such is the language of the minority. How can they, with a serious face, desire us to undertake this enquiry, in order to satisfy the people? the people, if their former assertions are to be credited, will receive no good at our hands. They will regard what we say no more than a knot of coffee-house politicians. We are too ridiculous as well as odious, to do any thing that will appear gracious in their eyes. What is the conclusion to be drawn? let us satisfy ourselves. Let us act according to the dictates of honour and conscience, and be at peace with our own minds. It is thus that we shall sooner or later regain the confidence of our constituents, if we have lost it; and not by humouring, as foolish nurses humour great lubberly boys, the wayward whims of a misled multitude. The characteristic of this house, should be a firm and manly steadiness, an unshaken perseverance in the pursuit of great and noble plans of general utility, and not a wavering inconstant fluctuation of counsels regulated by the shifting of the popular breeze. If we are not to judge for ourselves, but to be ever at the command of the vulgar, and their capricious shouts and hisses, I cannot see what advantage the nation can reap from a representa